We report estimates of the fiscal multiplier for interwar Britain based on quarterly data, time-series econometrics, and 'defense news'. We find that the government expenditure multiplier was in the range 0.3 to 0.8, much lower than previous estimates. The scope for a Keynesian solution to recession was less than is generally supposed. We find that rearmament gave a smaller boost to real GDP than previously claimed. Rearmament may, however, have had a larger impact than a temporary public works program of similar magnitude if private investment anticipated the need to add capacity to cope with future defense spending.
Introduction
The financial crisis of 2008/9 and the difficulties in escaping from recession since the crisis have re-awakened interest in Keynesian economic policies. This suggests that the time is right for a reappraisal of the British experience in the 1930s. This is a period with considerable relevance for today, in particular because after 1932 nominal interest rates were very low both during an initial phase of fiscal consolidation and a later one of rearmament financed partly by borrowing. More generally, much of the interwar period saw considerable slack in the British economy. The size of the fiscal multiplier in such conditions is of obvious interest to today's policymakers, just as it has been to economic historians working on the macroeconomics of interwar Britain.
The British experience of downturn and recovery is reported in Table 1 . A fall in GDP, which was very modest compared with the United States, was followed by a strong recovery in the years after 1933. Before 1935, insofar as this recovery was the result of policy, it had to come from monetary stimulus. Fiscal policy only began to play a role after 1935 when rearmament provided a de-facto Keynesian stimulus.
It has been a widely-held belief among British economic historians that rearmament delivered a powerful stimulus in the late 1930s (Robertson, 1983, p. 280) . In taking this position they echo the comment of The Economist of 22 April 1939 that "Britain's rearmament programme is the greatest public works programme ever devised in time of formal peace". A paper by Mark Thomas (1983) is the only serious attempt to quantify the impact of rearmament on economic activity. His method was based on an input-output table and a social accounting matrix and he found that the multiplier was 1.64 in 1935 and 1.60 in 1938 . This generated an estimate that rearmament produced over a million jobs by 3 1938 by which time the increase of £204 million in defense expenditure since 1934 would have raised GDP by £326 million or 6.5 per cent. As Roger Middleton has noted in a recent literature survey, Thomas's results have been much cited and provide "a quantitative demonstration that at least military Keynesianism worked" (2011, p. 14).
Thomas's finding that the government-expenditure multiplier was about 1.6 is within the range of 1.25 to 1.75 thought plausible by Timothy Hatton (1987) in an influential review of estimates made in the 1980s which still comprise almost all the literature available today.
Even so, this estimate may not be reliable since it assumes away any crowding out and may therefore be too large leading to an exaggeration of the impact of rearmament. Much of the historiography focuses on the possible impact of public expenditure proposals to reduce unemployment made by John Maynard Keynes and Hubert Henderson. These proposals were taken up by the Liberal Party under David Lloyd George at the 1929 general election. T. Thomas (1981) estimated the government-expenditure multiplier to be 0.98 in the short-run and 1.44 in the long-run using a simulation of a Keynesian macro-econometric model.
Stephen Broadberry's (1986) estimation of an IS-LM model gave a value of 1.22 for the fiscal multiplier. More recently, Nicholas Dimsdale and Nicholas Horsewood (1995) incorporated aggregate supply with a high degree of nominal inertia as well as aggregate demand into a macro-econometric model for the interwar period. They, conclude that the short run multiplier was about 1.5 and the long run as much as 2.5. All of these authors explicitly or implicitly conclude that the impact of government expenditure on employment would have 4 been considerably lower than claimed by Keynes and Henderson. Low enough that that Lloyd George 'could not have done it '. 1 The methods employed in these papers to obtain estimates of the multiplier are open to challenge and are not those which would be used by macroeconomists today. The models they rely upon basically embody Keynesian ideas in their specification with a traditional consumption function and may not adequately reflect crowding out, with the implication that the estimated multipliers are too large. For example, models in either the modern neoclassical or new Keynesian traditions which embody optimizing behavior by forwardlooking households typically expect consumer expenditure to fall rather than increase in response to an increase in government expenditure -in other words: the multiplier may be less than 1.
2 If these models of a more recent vintage were applicable to the 1930s, then the strong likelihood is that the conventional wisdom that rearmament had a big impact on GDP would be incorrect. This suggests that a fresh look at the size of the multiplier in 1930s'
Britain using modern techniques is desirable.
Given that theoretical predictions are model-dependent it is important to let the data speak and, since the seminal paper by Olivier Blanchard and Roberto Perotti (2002) , vector autoregression (VAR) techniques have often been used to estimate multipliers from quarterly macroeconomic time series, although many economists prefer to base their ideas of the value of the multiplier on the results of calibrations of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models, where an interesting aspect is how far these may vary according 1 This is a reference to the title of the pamphlet published by Keynes and Henderson, Can Lloyd George Do It? This claimed that a public works program of £100 million for 3 year would reduce unemployment by 500,000, a claim that quantitative economic historians reject. 2 For a convenient summary of predictions from a variety of macroeconomic models see Hebous (2011).
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to the state of the economy. 3 The big problem in estimating multipliers using VARs is the validity of the identification assumptions that are made, in particular whether government expenditure can be treated as exogenous and unanticipated. 4 It is fair to say that the use of these techniques has produced quite a wide range of estimates of the size of the government-expenditure multiplier (ΔY/ΔG) for the post-war American economy, with a recent authoritative survey concluding that it probably lies between 0.8 and 1.5.
Building a convincing DSGE model for the interwar British economy would be an ambitious undertaking. However, it is now possible to revisit the question of the size of the fiscal multiplier using time-series econometrics rather than relying on a traditional macroeconomic model, as has been the practise hitherto, thanks to the development of a quarterly series for real GDP for the interwar UK economy by James Mitchell, Solomos Solomou and Martin Weale (2012) . 6 This is our focus. In undertaking this task, we make use of Valerie Ramey's approach to resolving the endogeneity of government expenditure using announcements of new expenditures (2011a). She argues for the use of changes in the present value of expected future defense spending and both she and Robert Barro and Charles Redlick (2011) have implemented this approach in recent papers. Their estimates of the multiplier vary a bit according to the sample period used but for the postwar era both papers suggest a range of 0.6 to 0.8. We construct a defense-news variable from contemporary sources and develop a similar analysis to estimate ΔY/ΔG for interwar Britain. 6 We use the results to provide a reappraisal of the claims in the historiography relating to the possible impact on real GDP both of the hypothetical Lloyd George fiscal stimulus, or 'the Keynesian solution', and of the actual rearmament program.
Defense News
The aim of 'Defense News' is to reflect changes to planned government defense expenditure previously unanticipated by the public. More precisely, the aim is to chronicle changes in the information set available to an informed member of the public and calculate their implications for the expected present value of future defense expenditure. This variable can be thought of as capturing exogenous shocks to a key component of government spending.
The series for changes in the expected present value of government expenditure on defense for the United Kingdom in the interwar period has been constructed using a similar method to that employed by Ramey (2009) The Economist has been cross-checked against the detailed descriptions of British budgets provided by Bernard Mallet and Oswald George (1929, 1933) and by Basil Sabine (1970) .
Using the log we made an estimate of the present discounted value of defense expenditure for 1920 quarter1 and then updated it each quarter until 1938 quarter 4. In moving forward through time, for each quarter we compiled a present value figure based on the information set available in the previous quarter and one using the current information. The difference between the two estimates is 'Defense News' for the quarter. Expected values were calculated at 1938 prices for a horizon of five years using a discount rate of 5.1 per cent.
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Much of the time there was no news, i.e., the information set was the same as in the previous quarter. Estimates of 'Defense News' are reported in Table 2 .
We rely on the major historical studies of military policy, such as those of John Ferris (1989) and George Peden (1979) , to interpret the commentary of The Economist. The former fills 8 Figures in current prices have been converted to constant 1938 prices using the monthly retail price index in Capie and Collins (1983, A full discussion of how the 'Defense News' variable was constructed can be found elsewhere (Crafts, 2012) . Here we provide some context and briefly discuss the two episodes which require careful interpretation because government policy was in flux.
The interwar period started with fiscal consolidation following the explosion of the public debt during and immediately after World War I; for defense this meant disarmament. In 1919, the government set out its view that 'normal expenditure' on the fighting forces would be £93.5 million per year (BPP, 1919) . 9 The plan was based on the assumption that no expeditionary force would be required for a great war in the next decade: the '10-Year Rule'. The interpretation of this rule was, however, disputed in budget planning discussions, with each service arguing that it had to be ready for a major conflict by 1929 while the 1935 (Peden, 1979, p. 67) . In 1934/35, defense expenditure was £124.7 million.
The third phase was rearmament. The new policy was announced, but with no spending commitments, in the Defense White Paper of March 1935 (BPP, 1935 . This statement simply said that additional expenditure on the armaments of the defense services could no longer safely be postponed. In late 1935, the Cabinet agreed a total program of £1075 million over the period 1936-40 (Peden, 1979, p. 77) . The pace of rearmament was further intensified when the Defense White Paper of February 1937 (BPP, 1937 stated that it would be imprudent to contemplate total expenditure of less than £1500 million over the next five years, while expenditure over the next two or three years would be greatly increased. This announcement of a greatly enhanced military build-up was accompanied by the Defense Loans Act, which gave specific approval for £400 million of this to be financed by borrowing. propose budget cuts of £100 million at current prices. At the time, The Economist predicted that defense would bear the brunt and that the government would shrink from implementing the full amount of the cuts. It turned out that the Geddes proposal of a defense cut of £58.5 million was scaled back to £38 million.
These developments are reflected in the 'Defense News' estimates reported in Table 2 (Peden, 1979, p. 77) . We assume that at this point the public expected defense expenditure of £212 million per year for the next 5 years. We also assume that the public's expectations were ratcheted up again in early 1937. Specific commitments were made in the Defense White Paper and the Defense Loans Act underpinned the credibility of this announcement. We assume that in 1937 quarter 1 the public expected future expenditure to be £300 million per year through 1942 to match the Defense White Paper plans which The Economist of March 20 thought would be carried out.
In Table 2 , the observations for 'Defense News' in 1935 through 1937 are abnormally large.
We have constructed them on the basis of a careful and thorough reading of The Economist. 12 Nevertheless, there must have been considerable uncertainty at the time both about the detail of the government's plans and the extent to which they would be implemented. This could lead to downward-biased estimates of the normal government expenditure multiplier either because the 'Defense News' numbers are outliers or if they are unreliable. Accordingly, in what follows we present results both for a full interwar sample period and also for a period truncated at 1934 Q4 which omits the potentially problematic years at the end.
12 Details of the calculations of the expected value of future defense expenditure can be found in Crafts (2012).
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Econometric Modeling
The defense news variable that we use in our econometric modeling, news, is, following Ramey (2011a) , the series given in Table 2 divided by the one-quarter lagged value of real GDP; news is shown in Figure 1 . We begin by employing an approach similar to that of Barro and Redlick (2011) . 13 This has the following general specification: 14 The lag length was set at 4 to model any seasonality present in the data (seasonally unadjusted data was used throughout). The contemporaneous term of news was included but all other variables were lagged to avoid problems of endogeneity. The control variables included were lags of export growth, changes in the money multiplier, consol yields and the tax rate, and the unemployment rate. Growth rates and changes were used to ameliorate problems caused by the nonstationarity of many of the variables when expressed as levels. The error term t u is specified as the ARCH (1) during 1926 and 1927. 15 In each case we reports estimates based on a final specification, in which insignificant variables have been deleted (see Table 3 ). For the estimated coefficients of the included control variables see Table A1 column ( . Given the estimates in Table 2 the multiplier is and n  , these being reported in Columns (2)-(4) of Table 4 . These were then inserted into equation (2) to obtain a set of indirect multipliers and an overall multiplier, defined as the sum of the direct and indirect multipliers: the time path of the direct and the total overall multipliers are shown in Figure 3 . The total overall multiplier is 16 Because the contemporaneous news regressor was found to be insignificant in (1), this was omitted from the specification of (2). 17 The reasoning behind this statement is as follows. If defense news is denoted X, then Two additional points are worth noting. First, the equation in column (2) shows that defense news does indeed predict subsequent defense expenditure. Second, it should be remembered that ending the sample period at 1934Q 4 excludes the defense news data which are subject to relatively large margins of error. This implies that finding a multiplier well below 1 is robust to excluding the largest and least certain values for defense news.
The clear implication is that there was some crowding out of private expenditure even in a 'depressed economy'. This issue can be explored using an approach recently proposed by Ramey (2012) . In the current context, Ramey's equation may be specified as Table 5 . Government expenditure has an overall negative effect on private expenditure, with the total impact estimated to be -0.23 for the full sample and -0.28 for the shorter sample. 19 This confirms that the multiplier, ΔY/ΔG, is < 1 with implied values of 0.77 for the full sample and 0.72 for the shorter sample.
The Impact of Rearmament on GDP
18 As the analytical form of the total multiplier is a highly non-linear function of the coefficients of the various regressions only asymptotic standard errors can be calculated via the 'delta' method, which may be rather unreliable here. However, we conjecture that it is in the region of that calculated for the Barro-Redlick multiplier, i.e., in the region of 0.1 on an annualized basis. We can use our estimates of the multiplier to examine the impact of rearmament on economic recovery in Britain in the 1930s and compare our findings with those of the bestknown paper on this topic by Thomas (1983) 20 Anticipation effects are well documented in studies of the effects of fiscal policy changes, cf., Mertens and Ravn (2012) , and are a well-known complication in seeking to estimate multipliers as Ramey (2011b, p. 680) makes clear. In the context of government expenditure, anticipation effects occur when the private sector spends more now not as a result of today's government expenditure but only because future spending is confidently expected. The latter is not part of the conventional multiplier concept.
The push included a notable surge in investment for aircraft production and the formation of three important new armaments manufacturing companies. David Chambers's recent compilation of data on all interwar IPOs shows that 20 of the 27 aircraft manufacturing ventures were launched between 1934Q 3 and 1936Q 2 , when the increase in actual defense spending was still relatively small. 21 Robertson' view suggests we can use our defense news methodology, which was really designed to facilitate an estimate of the multiplier, to simulate the impact of rearmament on GDP. In principle, the overall multiplier time path from our preferred specification could be used to compute the estimated monetary impact on GDP of defense-news shocks as in Figure 4 , which uses a five-year horizon on the basis of a multiplier of 0.34. 22 The Figure   clearly shows the rapid increase in this impact after 1934, driven by the very large defensenews shocks starting in 1935. Table 6 sets out in more detail the simulated impact of defense news on GDP during the recovery period and also reports actual defense expenditure. Based on the total multiplier (including the direct and indirect components)
for the full period, this impact averaged 5.1 per cent of GDP in 1938 and amounted to £246.2 million (at 1938 prices) for the four quarters.
One must be careful not to put too much weight on these estimates because the defense news shocks in these years were very large. For example, the defense news shock in 1937Q 1 is estimated as £393 million on the basis of the Defense White Paper stating that total defense expenditure over the next five years would be at least £1500 million. compares with actual defense spending in 1936/7 of about half that amount (£194.6 million). Clearly, an impact of 5.1 per cent of GDP would entail a very substantial boost to investment from the anticipation effect and is perhaps best regarded as an upper bound estimate since the increase in investment in manufacturing sectors relevant to the war effort was £57.9 million (at 1938 prices), only £16.5 million more than in 1934.
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Overall rearmament provided a significant stimulus to recovery in the late 1930s. That said, the evidence points to a smaller impact than is found (or implied) by the earlier literature on fiscal multipliers in 1930s' Britain. All this suggests considerable caution before accepting without qualification Thomas's often cited conclusion that "the success of rearmament in creating employment ... leads us to view the eschewment of fiscal policy in the thirties as a missed opportunity" (1983, p. 571). Our results suggest that, if it is believed that rearmament had a substantial impact, this would be on the basis of the implications of massive future spending plans rather than because there was a large fiscal multiplier. The implication is that a conventional temporary program of expenditure on public works of similar magnitude to the actual increase in defense spending between 1934 and 1938 would have had a much smaller impact on GDP than Thomas's model seems to imply.
Discussion
Both of our econometric models imply that the government expenditure multiplier in interwar Britain was well below 1. A reasonable conclusion from our estimations is that the government expenditure multiplier was between 0.3 and 0.8. This is much lower than the estimates in the historiography reviewed earlier; these ranged between 1.2 and 2.5. As we noted, however, those multipliers were not obtained using modern methods and are clearly 23 Derived from Feinstein (1965) based on his sectors 8. 21, 8.22, 8.23, 8.24, 8.25, and 8.41. 20 questionable. On the other hand, our estimates are quite similar to those found for the United States using a defense-news approach.
There are two reasons as to why the multiplier may have been quite modest even in the 1930s. First, new-Keynesian models predict a large multiplier when interest rates are at the 'zero lower bound.' In these circumstances a deficit-financed increase in government spending leads expectations of inflation to increase and the stimulus comes through a fall in the real interest rate. In 1930s Britain, the decline in real interest rates was far less dramatic than in the post-gold standard United States. 24 Second, the legacy of World War I meant that the ratio of public debt to GDP remained above 140 per cent and peaked at nearly 180 per cent in 1933 (Middleton, 2010) . Economists have found that, once the level of government debt is over 100 per cent of GDP, the response of output to government spending shocks is very small even in deep recessions (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2011) .
A theoretical reason for this result is that expectations of large tax increases are high when the debt to GDP ratio is high (Perotti, 1999) . There seems to be stronger modern evidence for consumption reductions stemming from 'Ricardian-equivalence' offsets when the debt to GDP ratio is above 100 per cent (Rohn, 2010) .
As Roger Middleton (1985, ch. 8) noted, in the 1930s the balanced-budget orthodoxy was strong and extra government spending that threatened fiscal rectitude led to expectations of proximate tax increases. Any reader of The Economist's features on public finances and commentary on taxes required to balance the budget would have been painfully aware of the need to raise tax revenues in these circumstances and there were regular changes in 21 income tax rates to this end. 25 Indeed, in the debate on the budget in 1933, the Treasury publicly maintained that any possible expansionary effects from an unbalanced budget might be vitiated by expectations of future tax increases and that the strong public commitment to the balanced budget rule by government ministers meant that any suggestion of a deficit would lead to expectations of higher taxation.
So some private-expenditure offset to increased defense spending through Ricardian equivalence would not seem unreasonable, especially in a highly unequal economy where income-tax paying classes accounted for a large share of consumption. 26 The suggestion that news of future defense spending might work to reduce consumption through negative wealth effects is bolstered by Broadberry's (1988) estimates of the aggregate consumption function. He finds a significant role for wealth effects. One should not however jump to the other extreme and conclude that the 1930s recovery in Britain was triggered by the expansionary effects of a fiscal contraction initiated to rescue teetering public finances from the damage of the world economic crisis. 27 On the contrary, our estimates point to a positive fiscal multiplier, albeit smaller than those of other scholars. They do have the nice property that they echo the views of the British Treasury at the time, namely, that the multiplier was positive but less than 1 (Middleton, 1985, p. 163) .
So where did recovery come from? Insofar as it was stimulated by policy, the initial phase was based on leaving the gold standard and 'cheap money'. The policy stance was developed quite fully by late-1932. It entailed low nominal interest rates and a commitment 25 Sabine (1970) records that the standard rate of income tax was changed 7 times (6 up, 1 down) in the 1930s. Overall, it rose from 20 per cent at the start to 35 per cent at the end. 26 The top 20 per cent had 46 per cent of disposable income in 1937 while those paying income tax with incomes above £125 per year accounted for about 2/3 of consumption according to estimates by Barna (1945) . 27 Middleton's (2010) estimates show an increase in the constant-employment budget surplus of about 4 per cent of GDP between 1929/30 and 1933/34. 22 to raising the price level, underpinned by an exchange-rate target of a 25 per cent nominal devaluation compared with the gold-standard parity, which was enforced through intervention in the foreign exchange market (Howson, 1975 (Howson, , 1980 Thomas (1981) , whose estimate of the long-run multiplier was 1.44, concluded that by the third year real GDP would be increased by £120 million and unemployment reduced by 329,000. Dimsdale and Horsewood (1995) did support the idea of a relatively large multiplier but their more detailed treatment of the labor market led them to conclude that even though the Keynes-Henderson stimulus would have raised real GDP by £182-£202 million by year 3, unemployment would have been reduced only by 302,000-333,000. Given that to reduce unemployment to 'normal levels' in 1932 would have entailed cutting it by close to three million, there is a consensus that at that point there was no possibility of a Keynesian solution to unemployment.
Based on an estimate of 0.8 for the government expenditure multiplier, we are considerably more pessimistic about the impact of the Keynes-Henderson program; Lloyd George would 28 The increase in real GDP is based on the estimates in Mitchell et al. (2012) .
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have been hard pressed to cut unemployment by much more than 200,000. So we share the consensus view that it would be unwise to have expected too much from fiscal stimulus in the early 1930s. Moreover, insofar as there were risks that the viability of the cheap money policy could be threatened by announcing a fiscal stimulus which might trigger a rise in risk premia, our results suggest that this gamble was less worth taking than has hitherto been believed. 
Conclusions
We have developed a new approach to estimating the government expenditure multiplier for interwar Britain using quarterly data, time series econometrics, and defense news announcements. This gives very different results from those found by previous researchers who may not have fully captured the crowding out of private by public expenditure. Our estimates suggest a value in the range 0.3 to 0.8 after three years compared with at least 1.2 in the earlier literature. Evidently, our estimates for the multiplier suggest that there was less scope to use public works to raise GDP and reduce unemployment than has generally been supposed by economic historians and by the early Keynesians. This means that we are in full agreement with earlier writers that 'Lloyd George could not have done it', i.e., that a £100 million pounds program of public works annually for three years would not have reduced unemployment by 500,000 but by 200,000 or less.
Given the circumstances of the early 1930s, we think contemporaries were right to worry that a significant fiscal stimulus would have pushed interest rates up and undermined the cheap money policy which helped to promote recovery in Britain after 1932. If there was 29 Middleton (2010, p. 436) sets up the government's policy options in exactly this way.
24
such a trade-off between using fiscal or monetary policy to stimulate the economy at that time, then our results tilt the balance further towards relying on monetary policy.
Macroeconomists have become more aware that the magnitude of the multiplier may vary according to the state of the economy. 30 In that respect, we conjecture that a small multiplier in interwar Britain may reflect the high ratio of public debt to GDP and the worries of private agents that increased government spending might imply large future taxes given the fragility of public finances.
Nevertheless, we find that rearmament delivered a valuable, if limited, stimulus after 1935.
Our estimate is that, in the absence of the rearmament program, real GDP in 1938 would have been, at most, 5 per cent lower. It is important, however, that for such a large impact to play out would require a large private-sector response to news of massive future defense expenditure rather than coming from a big fiscal multiplier. If a similar amount to that disbursed on defense had been spent on a temporary public works program in the mid 1930s, then based on a multiplier of ≤ 0.8 the boost to real GDP would probably have been no more than a little over 3 per cent and the impact on unemployment would have been relatively modest. 30 See, for example, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2011) and Ilzetzki et al. (2010) . Figure 4 Simulated effect of defense news shocks on GDP using a five-year horizon.
